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The European Commission has launched a number of antitrust investigations against the major energy 
incumbents in the aftermath of the energy sector inquiry. Most of them have already been settled 
under Article 9 of the EC Regulation 1/2003 and the undertakings offered far-reaching, sometimes 
structural, commitments. This article studies the 2008 investigation into price manipulation in the 
German electricity wholesale market. In spite of no convincing evidence and flaws in the assessment, 
the Commission was able to negotiate from E.ON substantial capacity divestments.  
The Commission is straightforward about using antitrust rules to open up energy markets. Sector 
inquiries, commitment procedure and structural remedies allow for a quick intervention, flexible 
problem-solving and bring about decisive changes in the energy market setting. However, harnessing 
antitrust for the purpose of energy liberalization policy has an adverse impact on competition 
enforcement itself. First, it leads to a number of ‘weak’ cases, based on far-fetched arguments. Second, 
it results in remedies which are not tailored to the abuse at issue, but are in line with a wider objective 
of energy market liberalization, and as an outcome of negotiations, further swayed by the firm’s own 
interest in the ultimate shape of the commitment package. 
Keywords 




A wave of antitrust investigations has shaken the European energy sector in the recent years.
1 In spite 
of being formally liberalized in 2007, energy markets remained in fact closed to competition.
2 To get a 
better insight into the problem, the Commission opened a sector-wide inquiry which confirmed the 
concerns and identified several areas where competition issues are likely to arise.
3 The sector inquiry 
was then followed by a number of individual antitrust investigations targeting energy incumbents in 
several Member States. Ten out of fourteen cases have already been closed and in eight of them 
companies offered far-reaching, sometimes structural, commitments, ushering in a new pattern of 
antitrust enforcement. In the light of the slow-paced energy liberalization process this no-nonsense go-
ahead application of competition rules comes as no surprise. Energy market reforms face strong 
governmental opposition in several countries.
4 The lack of political will holds up market opening via 
regulatory measures.
5 The Commission may hope to achieve the same effects by antitrust deals with 
energy incumbents, bypassing at the same time the difficult legislative process. 
                                                      
*  Forthcoming in World Competition: Law and Economics Review, Vol. 34, Issue 3 September 2011. Many thanks are due 
to Massimo Motta, Klaus Heine, Natalia Fabra, Jan Bouckaert, Pierre Larouche, Firat Cengiz, Bert Willems, Niels 
Philipsen, Martin Godfried and the participants of the seminars at TILEC, Tilburg University, and RILE, Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, for their insightful comments and discussions. The views expressed and all remaining errors are 
the author’s own. 
1  So far the Commission has launched fourteen antitrust investigations in the aftermath of the energy sector inquiry: 
Commission Decision of 11 October 2007 in case COMP/37.966 – Distrigaz; Commission Decision of 5.03.2008 in case 
COMP/38.700 – Greek lignite and electricity markets; inspections in the German market - IP/06/483, 12 December 
2006 and Commission Decision of 26 November 2008 in case COMP/39.388 – German electricity wholesale market; 
Commission Decision of 26 November 2008 in case COMP/39.389 – German electricity balancing market; Commission 
Decision of 18 March 2009 in case COMP/39.402 – RWE gas foreclosure; Commission Decision of 8 July 2009 in case 
COMP/39.401 – E.ON/GDF (prohibition decision); Commission Decision of 3 December 2009 in case COMP/39.316 – 
GDF foreclosure; Commission Decision of 17 March 2010 in case COMP/39.386 - Long term electricity contracts in 
France; Commission Decision of 14 April 2010 in case COMP/39.351 – Swedish Interconnectors; Commission Decision 
of 4 May 2010 in case COMP/39.317 – E.ON gas foreclosure; COMP/39.315 – ENI (opening of proceedings, 20 April 
2007; market test of commitments - Market Test Notice of 5 March 2010, OJ C 055, 2010, pp. 13-15); COMP/39.387 -
 Long term electricity contracts in Belgium (opening of proceedings, 18 July 2007 – IP/07/313); COMP/39.442 – French 
electricity wholesale market (inspections, 11.03.2009 – IP/09/104); inspections in the Czech electricity sector (24 
November 2009 – IP/09/518). 
2  N. Kroes, ‘Introductory remarks on Final Report of Energy Sector Competition Inquiry’, SPEECH/07/4 (2007). Full 
liberalization of markets for electricity and gas has been introduced as from 1 July 2007, see Article 21 of Directive 
2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal 
market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC, OJ L 176, 15 July 2003, pp. 37-56; Article 23 of Directive 
2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC, OJ L 176, 15 July 2003, pp. 57-78.  
3  Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors. 
The underlying methodology and the outcomes of the inquiry are set out in the DG Competition report on energy 
sector inquiry (the “Final Report”), SEC(2006)1724, 10 January 2007. The sector inquiry assessment is supported by an 
in-depth quantitative analysis of six European electricity markets (incl. Germany) carried out by external consultants at 
the request of the Commission. For the results see London Economics, “Structure and performance of six wholesale 
electricity markets in 2003, 2004 and 2005”, 2007 (the “LE Study”) and the Final Report, paras. 997-1020, for the 
summary. 
4  Germany and France, later joined by Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Luxemburg, Latvia and Slovakia formed a strong 
opposition towards the Commission’s proposal of ownership unbundling of energy production and distribution assets. 
5  Due to resistance of eight ‘blocking’ countries, the political compromise on the final shape of the 3
rd Energy 
Liberalization Package reached in 2009 was far less ambitious than initially expected: ownership unbundling is not 
mandatory; the companies are allowed to opt for two less radical unbundling models, one of which has been supported by 
the eight ‘blocking’ countries; IP/09/622, 22 April 2009. Małgorzata Sadowska 
2 
Liberalization and competition policy pursue effectively coinciding goals with respect to the 
European energy markets. Liberalization removes monopolies and exclusive rights and fosters 
competitive forces up to a point where they, alone, can exercise disciplining pressure on the market 
players.
 6 Competition policy ensures that these competitive forces are not disrupted, impacting either 
on the market structure or the firms’ conduct. Hence, competition policy plays crucial role in the 
liberalization process. Seen from this angle, it seems there is nothing wrong in harnessing antitrust 
rules to accomplish the objective of energy liberalization. Further, the 2004 reform introduced changes 
to antitrust enforcement substantially facilitating the application of antitrust rules in the energy sector. 
First of all, the new EC Regulation 1/2003 empowered the Commission to launch sector inquiries in 
markets where competition appears to be restricted or distorted.
7 Secondly, Article 9 provided for a 
relatively simple and quick settlement procedure for antitrust cases, where the remedy package is 
negotiated between the Commission and the firm (commitment procedure).
8 Finally, pursuant to 
Article 7 and Recital 12, the Commission can impose structural remedies in antitrust cases.
9 Hence, 
under the new antitrust enforcement regime, the Commission is well-equipped to intervene in the 
energy sector and negotiate structural solutions directly with the energy incumbents. 
Even though the idea of using antitrust policy to foster energy market liberalization appears sound 
from a teleological and legal point of view, its application may raise concerns. The new pattern of 
antitrust enforcement marked by a widespread use of commitment procedure and increased 
intervention on the market structure has two serious implications.  
First, to increase its bargaining power and negotiate far-reaching commitments, the Commission 
may come up with a number of serious anticompetitive allegations. However, Article 9 allows the 
Commission to close antitrust investigations with no finding of an infringement, significantly lowering 
the standard of proof. Since neither the dominant position, nor the abuse requires further evidence, the 
Commission’s preliminary concerns are not further investigated rendering the assessment far more 
perfunctory that it would be under a standard infringement procedure. Settled cases may be thus 
‘weak’ cases, based on far-fetched allegations. 
Second, the commitments, often extensive structural measures, are not designed to address the 
antitrust concerns but are rather an outcome of negotiations and horse-trading between, on the one 
hand, the Commission, concerned with the slow pace of the energy liberalization process and, on the 
other hand, the firm, possibly having its own, not always that obvious, interest in the ultimate shape of 
the commitment package.  
To illustrate these arguments, the paper takes a closer look at the E.ON case – an 2008 
investigation under Article 102 TFEU
10 mainly into price manipulation on the German wholesale 
electricity market.
11 In this case, in spite of no convincing evidence and a questionable theory of harm, 
the Commission has negotiated with E.ON far-reaching structural commitments.
12 The commitments, 
                                                      
6  M. Armstrong and D. Sappington, ‘Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization’, Journal of Economic Literature 44 
(2006): 359.   
7  Article 17 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4 January 2003, 1-25. 
8  Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, note 7 above. 
9  Article 7 and Recital 12 of Regulation 1/2003, note 7 above. 
10  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 83, 30 March 2010. 
11  Case COMP/39.388 – German electricity wholesale market, note 1 above. 
12  The analysis of the E.ON case presented in this paper is based on the publicly accessible case documents. However, one 
cannot exclude that the Commission might have been in possession of a ‘smoking gun’ evidence that induced E.ON to 
offer substantial commitments just to avoid a high fine in an alternative scenario under the Article 7 infringement 
procedure. Whatever was the E.ON’s motivation to enter the settlement with the Commission, it is irrelevant for the 
hereby presented argumentation and can be left out of the scope of the paper. Energy Liberalization in Antitrust Straitjacket: A Plant Too Far? 
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requiring E.ON to sell 20% of its generation capacity and hence substantially diminishing its market 
share, altered the structure of the German electricity wholesale market, yet not necessarily addressing 
the concerns with respect to the E.ON’s abusive behaviour. Building on the insights from economic 
theory, the case study provides a twofold underpinning for the argument of this paper. First, it 
emphasizes the weak points in the Commission’s cursory analysis of the E.ON’s alleged 
anticompetitive behaviour. Second, it demonstrates that the commitments accepted in this case are not 
tailored to address the Commission’s concerns with regard to the alleged price manipulation. Instead, 
they are designed to accomplish wider policy objectives of energy market liberalization and, on the top 
of that, they are swayed by the E.ON’s own strategic interests. 
II. Far-fetched concerns 
Commitment procedure provides for a quick and efficient closing of antitrust cases. Instead of 
launching a standard infringement procedure under Article 7 of the EC Regulation 1/2003 the 
Commission may settle an antitrust case on the basis of a preliminary assessment and with no need to 
find an infringement of competition rules. Hence, in case of an (alleged) abuse of a dominant position, 
neither the dominant position nor the abuse needs to be demonstrated. Instead, pursuant to Article 9, if 
an undertaking offers commitments addressing the anticompetitive concerns expressed in the 
preliminary assessment, the Commission may issue a decision that makes those commitments binding 
on the undertaking. Such a commitment decision closes the case, stating that there are no longer 
grounds for the Commission to take action. 
The efficiency gains of the commitment procedure come at the cost of an in-depth analysis of the 
case. The fact that no infringement decision is made allows the Commission to focus its resources on 
the negotiation process and the outcome of the settlement whereas its preliminary anticompetitive 
concerns do not undergo any in-depth economic analysis. The lack of this ‘reality check’ combined 
with the Commission’s fervour to open up the energy markets entails a risk of far-fetched competition 
assessment. Namely, to increase its bargaining power and to negotiate extensive commitments in line 
with its liberalization plans, the Commission may deliberately extend the scope of the anticompetitive 
concerns in the preliminary assessment. Since commitments are supposed to meet the Commission’s 
concerns, the more substantial these concerns are, the more radical commitments the Commission may 
expect from the undertaking. This would not be possible under a standard infringement procedure, 
where any alleged abuse of dominant position must be eventually found. Commitment procedure, 
enabling such easy proliferation of anticompetitive concerns which are not subsequently verified or 
further analysed, promotes ‘weak’, unconvincing cases. The E.ON case provides a good example to 
demonstrate that under Article 9 anticompetitive concerns may be stretched beyond their proper limits. 
The German electricity wholesale market is broadly divided between four large electricity 
suppliers: E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall and EnBW. In 2007 the Commission launched an antitrust 
investigation into this market on the basis that E.ON may have abused its dominant position for the 
most part by price manipulation through strategic capacity withholding.
13 In that respect the 
preliminary assessment refers to the general findings of the energy sector inquiry.
14 According to 
them, the German electricity wholesale prices include noticeable mark-ups over and above the 
competitive benchmark.
15 Strategic withholding of capacity may be one of the reasons for high 
electricity prices.
16 ‘Load factor’ calculations for German plants demonstrated significant 
                                                      
13  See Annex. The case involves also deterrence of investment in generation by third parties. 
14  The Final Report, note 3 above, para. 427 and p. 150, Conclusions. 
15  The LE Study, note 3 above, Executive summary, p. 17. 
16  The Final Report, note 3 above, paras. 428-448. Suppliers can influence electricity prices in two ways, either by reducing 
output below the competitive, price-taking level (physical withholding) or by raising the price above the marginal cost 
(economic or financial withholding). S. E. Stoft, Power System Economics: Designing Markets for Electricity (IEEE Małgorzata Sadowska 
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discrepancies between the load factors of plants having similar marginal costs below the market price 
level, indicating that some plants did not operate at their full nameplate capacity at times when they 
were supposed to.
17 However, there might be several other plausible explanations for a lower capacity 
factor, i.e. equipment failure, routine maintenance, cogeneration, emissions quota used up or 
transmission constraints limiting the economic dispatch. Further, whether a given generator is actually 
willing and able to behave strategically and reduce its capacity to manipulate the market price depends 
on many factors, like the size and structure of the market, technology mix employed, demand level, 
eventual capacity and transmission constraints, the amount of capacity covered by bilateral contracts 
and market architecture.
18 The general conclusions of the energy sector are thus far from conclusive 
and need to be further investigated on a case-by-case basis. This however is not required in a 
settlement procedure.  
Dominance 
Article 102 TFEU deals with abuses of market power by dominant firms. Accordingly, in the first step 
the Commission focuses on the E.ON’s alleged dominant position on the German electricity wholesale 
market. Already at this initial stage the Commission’s assessment raise questions. 
First, the analytical techniques used by the Commission for the assessment of dominant position 
are based solely on traditional concentration indices, despite the fact that these are widely considered 
inadequate for measuring market power in generation markets. Market shares can only give a first 
proxy (negative test) of potential market power in electricity wholesale markets and must be 
accompanied by further electricity specific indices.
19 According to structural market concentration 
indices, E.ON in fact owned at that time a moderate (as for energy sector) share in the German 
electricity wholesale market (20-30% of generated capacity between 2002 and 2006).
20  
Second, and because the calculation of E.ON’s market share did not point to a dominant position
21, 
the Commission used a concept of collective dominance to be able at all to invoke Article 102 as the 
legal basis of the charge. Instead of using electricity specific indices to measure E.ON’s market power 
(and in this way prolong the investigation), the Commission preferred to state that ‘the German 
(Contd.)                                                                   
Press / Wiley Interscience, 2002): 454 (Glossary); D. S. Kirschen and G. Strbac, Fundamentals of Power System 
Economics (Wiley, 2004): 40. 
17  The term ‘load factor’ is somewhat misleading, since in the electrical engineering it represents the ratio between the 
average load and peak load [see e.g. Stoft, note 16 above: 13]. What is actually calculated here applies to the supply side 
and is the ratio between the actual generation of a plant over a period of time and its output if it had operated at its full 
nameplate capacity for the time considered. For details see Final Report, note 3 above: paras. 439-446 and the LE Study, 
note 3 above: 389-394. 
18  Based on the unilateral profit maximization logic of a withholding generator by P. Joskow and E. Kahn, ‘A Quantitative 
Analysis of Pricing Behavior in California’s Wholesale Electricity Market During Summer 2000: The Final Word’, The 
Energy Journal, 23, 4 (2002). See Annex, Figure II and accompanying text. 
19  D. Harbord and N. Fabra, ‘Market Power in Electricity Markets: Do Electricity Markets Require Special Regulatory 
Rules?’, Market Analysis Ltd. (2000): 66; D. Perekhodstev, L. B. Lave and S. Blumsack, ‘The Model of Pivotal 
Oligopoly Applied to Electricity Markets’, Carnegie-Mellon Electricity Industry Center Working Paper, CEIC 02-06 
(2002): 14; F. Wolak, ‘Diagnosing the California Energy Crisis’, The Electricity Journal, August / September, 11, 37 
(2003): 15; OECD, Competition Issues in the Electricity Sector, Background Note, OECD Journal of Competition Law 
and Policy Volume 6-4 (2005): 109-112; B. Willems and E. De Corte, ‘Market power mitigation by regulating contract 
portfolio risk’, Energy Policy 36 (2008): 3788; G. Federico and others, ‘Competition and Regulation in the Spanish Gas 
and Electricity Markets’, Reports of the Public-Private Sector Research Centre 1, IESE Business School – University of 
Navarra (2008):12. 
20  Commission Decision of 26.11.2008 in case COMP/39.388 – German electricity wholesale market, Table 1 at p. 5. The 
accurate market share could not be disclosed due to confidentiality requirements. 
21  The crucial range for establishing dominance is 40-50%: A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2004): 399. Taking into consideration E.ON’s strong competitors (RWE: 20-30%; Vattenfall: 10-20%) 
it would be extremely difficult for the Commission to find E.ON individually dominant in this market.  Energy Liberalization in Antitrust Straitjacket: A Plant Too Far? 
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wholesale electricity market is collectively dominated by the three operators E.ON, RWE and 
Vattenfall Europe within the meaning of Article 82 [ Article 102 TFEU ] of the Treaty.’
22 The concept 
of joint (or collective) dominance has been developed by the European Courts to allow Article 102 
application to abusive practices in oligopolistic setting. According to the settled case law, 
economically independent firms may be found collectively dominant if they are ‘sufficiently linked 
between themselves to adopt the same line of action on the market’.
23 Thus the Commission referred to 
the characteristics of the German wholesale electricity market (high concentration, high entry barriers, 
homogeneous product, transparency) and the existence of structural links between the generators 
(network of supply agreements) to justify the finding of collective dominance. The joint market share 
of the three firms rises to 67% (and 77% in German base-load generation only – hydro, nuclear and 
lignite).
24  
It is true that the characteristics of the electricity wholesale markets and the repetitive interaction of 
the generators makes these markets prone to collusive outcomes.
25 The Commission was clearly right 
to take account of this possibility. However, particularly for that reason, it should have used other 
techniques to measure market power than simple market share calculation. Evidence of market power 
on the basis of electricity specific indices (PSI, RSI)
26 which would indicate actual price-setters, would 
be particularly adequate to support any theory of collusion.  
Last but not least, the Commission’s argumentation lacks coherence. After having quoted all the 
findings of the preliminary assessment with regard to the joint dominant position of all three 
generators, the Commission raises doubt whether Vattenfall, due to structural and cost differences 
reported in the market test and the decisional practice of the German courts, could belong to the 
collectively dominant group. The question was left open, since ‘under both alternatives E.ON would 
be considered part of the collective dominant position’.
27 Yet throughout the decision only one 
alternative was considered, that is the joint dominance of the three generators. The Commission 
disregarded the fact that exclusion of one big player from the group changes the dynamics of the 
oligopolistic interaction. If the asymmetries between Vattenfall and the two remaining operators were 
indeed so apparent that it could not be part of the collectively dominant group, E.ON and RWE might 
not have pursued any common policy at all, either because it was less attractive in the first place or the 
collusion was unsustainable.  
Establishing collective dominance is often a very demanding exercise involving models of 
oligopoly interaction. Considering that the settlement procedure does not require any infringement to 
be found, finding of dominance is also not necessary. For that reason, a simple market share 
calculation supported by the Commission’s arguments on the existence of collective dominance was 
sufficient to adopt a commitment decision in the E.ON case. 
Abuse 
Further inconsistencies emerge in the Commission’s assessment of the abuse. The logic behind a 
profitable capacity withdrawal suggests that it is a unilateral exercise of market power and does not 
                                                      
22  Commission Decision, note 20 above, p. 4. 
23 Case  C-393/92  Almelo [1994] ECR I-1477, para. 42 (concerning the electricity market); Joined cases T-191/98, T-212/98 
to T-214/98 Atlantic Container Line AB and Others v. Commission [2003] ECR II-3275, para. 595. For the overview of 
collective dominance cases see Jones and Sufrin (2004), note 21 above: 827-841. 
24  Commission Decision, note 20 above, Table 1 and para. 15, p. 5. 
25  D. Newbery, ‘Electricity Liberalization in Britain: the Quest for a Satisfactory Wholesale Market Design’, The Energy 
Journal 26, Special Issue (2005): 57; OECD, note 19 above: 85; B. Willems and E. De Corte, note 19 above: 3787, note 
3; Federico and others, note 19 above: 10. 
26  Residual Supply Index, Pivotal Supplier Indicator. 
27  Commission Decision, note 20 above, paras. 23-24. Małgorzata Sadowska 
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require collusion among generators.
28 This does not mean, however, that several generators could not 
collude and reduce their capacities in concert in order to make one of them pivotal. As a result of 
strategic output reduction of its competitors, a pivotal generator may explore capacity constraints and 
bid above its marginal costs with no risk of being excluded from the dispatch. The higher market-
clearing price goes for the benefit of all colluding generators.
29  
Even though the Commission found E.ON, RWE (and Vattenfall) jointly dominant in the German 
electricity wholesale market, it still argued that only E.ON pursued the strategy of capacity 
withdrawal. According to the settled case law, the concept of joint dominance does not require the 
undertakings to exercise market power collectively. It may well be a unilateral abuse as long as it is 
committed to protect the joint dominant position.
30 However, according to the Commission’s finding 
in the preliminary assessment, E.ON, RWE (and Vattenfall) could have pursued a common policy to 
raise prices given the structural links on production and the high degree of transparency allowing the 
operators to detect and counter possible deviations.
31  To quote the Commission, ‘in terms of 
production, if an undertaking carrying out a withdrawal of capacity identifies that another one is 
increasing its production, given transparency the first undertaking could immediately react by doing 
the same. In terms of prices, the undertakings can immediately react to price offers on OTC markets 
and wage a price war’. This suggests that withdrawal appertained to the common policy adopted by 
the three (or two) operators and should not be assessed as a unilateral exercise of market power. 
However, for the purposes of commitment decision, the Commission did not have to go beyond the 
concerns expressed in the preliminary assessment. They in turn echoed the results of the sector inquiry 
and depicted E.ON’s capacity withdrawal as a unilateral profit maximizing strategy of a dominant 
generator.
32 Hence, the only valid argument for the adoption of a common policy to raise prices by all 
three (or two) generators remains the advantage they take from the price increase. However, the price 
increase brings a windfall profit for all the generators in the market and as such cannot constitute a 
stand-alone ground for developing a theory of coordination with respect to the three of them. 
The E.ON case does not deal only with price manipulation. According to the Commission’s 
findings, E.ON abused its (collective) dominant position on the German electricity wholesale market 
through ‘withholding of capacity and deterrence of investment in generation by third parties’.
33 The 
latter element of the charge points at an exclusionary strategy that only complements the exploitative 
behaviour and as such seems to be of secondary relevance. The Commission does not elaborate on this 
abuse in its decision. It takes solely four short paragraphs to explain that the short-term capacity 
withdrawal might be complemented by ‘a medium and long-term strategy of deterring actual or 
potential competitors from entering the generation market and thereby limiting the market volume in 
electricity generation’.
34 The exclusion consists of long-term electricity supply contracts and offering 
new competitors a participation in an E.ON power plant. According to the findings of the 
Commission, the deterrence of investments enabled E.ON to maintain the excessive price achieved by 
output reduction. 
                                                      
28  See Annex. Joskow and Kahn, note 18 above, consider a case where only one generator withdraws capacity whereas all 
the other generators submit bids equal their marginal costs. The authors show that the rational capacity withdrawal is a 
unilateral exercise of market power and does not require collusion among generators.  
29  G. S. Crawford, J. Crespo and H. Tauchen, ‘Bidding Asymmetries in Multi-Unit Auctions: Implications of Bid Function 
Equilibria in the British Spot Market for Electricity’, International Journal of Industrial Organization 25 (2007): 1258, 
note 48. 
30 Case  T-228/97  Irish Sugar plc v. Commission [1999] ECR II-2969, para. 66.  
31  Commission Decision, note 20 above, para. 20. 
32  Ibid., paras. 27-40. 
33  Ibid., para. 1. 
34  Ibid., paras. 41-44. Energy Liberalization in Antitrust Straitjacket: A Plant Too Far? 
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Again, the Commission’s concerns with respect to E.ON’s exclusionary abuse build upon the 
findings of the sector inquiry. According to that, long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) might 
reduce liquidity of the wholesale electricity markets, depending on the nature of such contracts. 
35 The 
Commission studies this effect in nine Member States, yet for some reason this analysis has not been 
done for Germany.
36 This raises doubts as to the validity of the charge and suggests a deliberate 
attempt of the Commission to extend the scope of concerns to include the allegations of exclusionary 
nature. First of all, by multiplying its concerns in the preliminary assessment, the Commission may 
hope for far-reaching remedies in the settlement.
37 Secondly, an exclusionary abuse shifts the legal 
basis to section (b) of Article 102 and in this way the Commission avoids criticism of pursuing purely 
exploitative “section (a)” abuses.  
One more remark must be made with respect to the link between the exploitative and exclusionary 
abuses which the Commission piled up in the E.ON case. According to the Commission, E.ON’s long-
term supply contracts complemented the output limiting strategy, as they effectively reduced the 
liquidity of the German electricity wholesale market and enabled E.ON to maintain the higher price 
resulting from capacity withdrawal. It is true that the long-term electricity supply agreements dry out 
spot markets, but at the same, by limiting the volume that contributes to the price formation process, 
they actually mitigate the potential pricing abuse on these markets.
38 If a big share of E.ON’s capacity 
is tied up by contracts (excluded from the pool) its incentive and ability to reduce output in order to 
manipulate the price decreases, since less volume is traded in the pool and the higher price accounts 
only for the uncontracted capacities. Once the gain from the price increase does not offset E.ON’s 
output reduction, the strategic capacity withdrawal ceases to be profitable. The Commission did not 
mention in the decision the volume of E.ON’s generation sold under fixed-price supply contracts. 
Paradoxically, supporting the case with alleged foreclosure effects of long-term supply contracts, the 
Commission undermined the theory of a profitable capacity withdrawal. Since the decision was 
adopted under Article 9, further explanation of the Commission’s concerns in that regard was not 
required. 
III. Far-reaching remedies 
The negotiatory character of the commitment procedure entails an inherent risk of accepting 
commitments disproportionate or even congruent to the (alleged) abuse they are supposed to eliminate 
in the first place. The remedies imposed by the Commission in an Article 7 infringement decision
39, 
either behavioural or structural, must be ‘proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary 
to bring the infringement effectively to an end.’ Article 9 of EC Regulation 1/2003, unlike Article 7, 
                                                      
35  The question is whether they are purely domestic, or import / export contracts. Domestic contracts and export contracts 
indeed reduce volumes of electricity traded on the wholesale market. Long-term import contracts, on the contrary, 
increase the liquidity of the domestic market. See also OECD, note 19 above: 115. 
36  Final Report, note 3 above, paras. 467-473 and Figure 57 at p. 158. 
37  For example, as explained in Section 0 below, the Commission’s concerns with regard to foreclosure effects of E.ON’s 
long-term PPAs might justify the choice of structural remedies instead of simply accepting less onerous behavioural 
forward contract commitments.  
38  Joskow and Kahn, note 18 above: 24; S. Borenstein and others, ‘Measuring market inefficiencies in California’s 
restructured wholesale electricity market’, American Economic Review 92-5 (2002): 1376-1405; Newbery (2005), note 
25 above: 48; OECD, note 19 above: 144-145; E. Armington, E. Emch and K. Heyer, ‘The Year in Review: Economics at 
the Antitrust Division, 2005–2006’, Review of Industrial Organization 29 (2006): 320; F. Wolak and S. McRae, ‘Merger 
Analysis in the Restructured Electricity Supply Industries: The Proposed PSEG and Exelon Merger’, Department of 
Economics, Stanford University (2007), forthcoming in: Kwoka J. and White L., The Antitrust Revolution: Economics, 
Competition and Policy (Oxford University Press, 2008): 16-18. See also M. A. De Frutos and N. Fabra, ‘How to 
Allocate Forward Contracts. The case of electricity markets’, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Working Paper (2009), 
for an analysis of pro-competitive allocation of forward contracts. 
39  Article 7 of EC Regulation 1/2003, note 7 above. Małgorzata Sadowska 
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does not refer expressly to proportionality. As a fundamental principle of EU law, however, the 
principle of proportionality applies to all measures adopted by the European institutions, including 
Article 9 commitments.
40 Hence, as all the other measures, the commitments ‘must not exceed what is 
appropriate and necessary for attaining the objective pursued.’
41 Apparently, the legal framework of 
the EC Regulation 1/2003 grants the Commission much more leeway as to the shape of accepted 
commitments than it enjoys when designing remedies in its infringement decisions. The 
proportionality test formulated in Article 7 demonstrates a clear direct link between the infringement 
(e.g. an abuse of dominant position through strategic capacity withholding) and the remedy imposed. 
The Commission can impose only such remedies which contribute to bringing the infringement to the 
end (abuse-remedy match). To the contrary, Article 9 setting allows for an abuse-remedy mismatch. 
The principle of proportionality does not require the commitments to match the abuse but rather to be 
consistent with the objective pursued by the measure in question (objective-remedy match). The 
wording of Article 9 provides further information as to the objective of commitments; they are offered 
by the undertakings ‘to meet the concerns expressed to them by the Commission in its preliminary 
assessment.’ It is true that the concerns of the Commission expressed in the preliminary assessment do 
refer to the alleged abuse. However, these concerns can well be of a more general nature, for example 
referring to the lack of competition in the market or to several possible abuses. As the name indicates, 
the Commission’s assessment is only preliminary.  
Concluding, the legal framework grants the Commission more latitude when accepting 
commitments under Article 9 than when imposing remedies under Article 7. The link between the 
abuse and remedy in Article 7 decisions is straightforward and leaves no discretion for the 
Commission in the assessment of proportionality of the remedies imposed. To the contrary, the 
principle of proportionality applied to commitments makes an indirect link between the (alleged) 
abuse and the commitments and allows the Commission, by extending the scope of concerns, to 
pursue wider liberalization goals through antitrust actions in individual cases [Figure 1]. 
                                                      
40  Recital 12 of EC Regulation 1/2003,note 7 above. 
41 Case  265/87  Schräder [1989] ECR 2237, para. 21; Case T-260/94 Air Inter v Commission [1997] ECR II-997, para. 144; 
case T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods v Commission [2003] ECR II-4653, para. 201 [underline mine].  Energy Liberalization in Antitrust Straitjacket: A Plant Too Far? 
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Figure 1: The concept of proportionality under Article 7 and Article 9 of EC Regulation 1/2003 – 
comparison 
 













A more elastic concept of proportionality under Article 9 makes procedural sense. First of all, antitrust 
settlements free of unnecessary red tape, are supposed to offer an attractive alternative to lengthy 
procedures under Article 7. In this respect requiring the Commission to carry out an extensive 
investigation into the proportionality of the offered commitments would run contrary to the very spirit 
and purpose of Article 9. Secondly, a commitment package is an outcome of negotiations, not a 
unilateral measure imposed by the Commission. Entering into settlement (voluntarily) and offering the 
commitments, the firm implicitly agrees on their final shape. Its active role in the settlement deprives 
the principle of proportionality of its protective value. Finally, a strict proportionality test under 
Article 9 would substantially complicate the negotiations, as the firms may often have their own (not 
always case-related) strategic interest in offering certain commitments in antitrust deals. In these 
cases, imposing a strict proportionality requirement on commitments would make Article 9 
settlements considerably less attractive for the firms. 
In spite of what suggests the wording of the EC Regulation, until very recently it was not clear 
whether there should be a difference in the application of the proportionality test to the remedies 
imposed in Article 7 cases and the application of the principle of proportionality to the commitments 
accepted in antitrust settlements. As Article 9 brought a new phenomenon to the European competition 
law, the Commission, as yet, has lacked supporting case law to precede in settlement cases. However, 
in June 2010 the European Court of Justice (the ECJ) took a clear and conclusive stance on that 
matter, setting aside the General Court’s (the EGC) judgment in the Alrosa case.
42 The ECJ recognized 
                                                      
42  The question of proportionality of commitments emerges into the limelight in the context of the Alrosa saga. In 2007 the 
EGC quashed the Commission’s decision in the Alrosa/De Beers case, one of the two commitment decisions eventually 
on appeal, on the grounds that the accepted commitments were disproportionate to the alleged infringement. The EGC 
made clear that the proportionality test applied to the commitments does not differ from the assessment of remedies 
imposed in an infringement decision. The case was long time pending before the ECJ (Case C-441/07 P; appeal brought 
on 26 September 2007 by the Commission). The Advocate General’s Opinion issued in September 2009 proposed to set 
aside the EGC judgment (Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 17 September 2009 in case C-441/07 P 
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that the commitments provide a more rapid solution resolving competition problems than the remedies 
imposed under Article 7 and hence their assessment in the light of the proportionality rule differs from 
the proportionality test applied in the infringement procedure. According to the Court, ‘[Article 9] 
does not require the Commission to make a finding of an infringement, its task being confined to 
examining, and possibly accepting, the commitments […] in the light of the problems identified by it in 
its preliminary assessment and having regard to the aims pursued. Application of the principle of 
proportionality by the Commission in the context of Article 9 […] is confined to verifying that the 
commitments in question address the concerns it expressed to the undertakings concerned and that 
they have not offered less onerous commitments that also address those concerns adequately.’
43 By 
acknowledging this, the ECJ clearly gave the Commission a judicial ‘green light’ to implement the 
energy liberalization policy through antitrust settlements.  
The E.ON investigation provides an interesting case study to find out whether the Commission 
takes advantage of a greater margin of assessment left to it under Article 9 and negotiates 
commitments that are not designed to fit the abusive behaviour but are supposed to achieve wider 
policy objectives. In the light of the German government’s opposition towards the 3
rd energy 
liberalization package, especially in the context of ownership unbundling, one might conjecture that 
the Commission will try to negotiate structural commitments from a German energy incumbent, 
having a clear energy liberalization objective in mind. And indeed, to address the Commission’s 
concerns E.ON offered to sell off about one-fifth of its generation capacity.
44 The attempt of this 
section is to examine, in a two-step proportionality test, whether the divestiture imposed in the E.ON 
case matched the alleged abuse (strategic capacity withdrawal) or not. A negative outcome of this test 
(abuse-remedy mismatch) would mean that the settlement procedure allows the Commission to accept 
remedies which it could not otherwise impose in an Article 7 infringement decision.  
•  Step 1: alternative behavioural commitments? 
According to the principle of proportionality, the Commission should not require divestment in 
circumstances in which a less onerous but equally effective behavioural remedy is available.
45 
Obviously, controlling E.ON’s bids and constant monitoring of its power plants to prevent eventual 
capacity withdrawal would be indeed burdensome both for the Commission and for the operator.
46 
Even though monitoring remedies are easily reversible, once sloppily implemented, they would remain 
ineffective. By contrast, forward contract commitments might effectively reduce E.ON’s incentives 
and the ability to use its capacities strategically. E.ON could offer to sell a sufficient amount of its 
generation under fixed-price contracts so that further capacity reduction in the pool would cease to be 
a profitable strategy to manipulate the market-clearing price.
47 Such a remedy however would run 
contrary to the Commission’s concerns of exclusionary nature, as it would further decrease the volume 
of electricity traded in the pool. For the same reason capacity divestment commitments, i.e. virtual 
(Contd.)                                                                   
Commission v Alrosa) AG Kokott argued that the Commission should be granted “the same margin of assessment in the 
context of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 which it enjoys, according to case-law, in connection with the assessment of 
commitments in merger control” (at para. 72). Finally, in June 2010, the ECJ followed the AG’s Opinion and overruled 
the EGC judgment (ECJ judgment of 29 June 2010 in case C-441/07 P, Commission v Alrosa, not yet reported). 
43  Case C-441/07 P, Commission v Alrosa, note 42, in fine) paras. 40-41 [underline mine]. 
44  Report on Competition Policy 2008: 50; Press Release IP/08/1774, 26 November 2008. 
45  See case law at note 41 above. 
46  The legal test in Article 7 suggests that the competition authority (CA) cannot impose a structural remedy just because an 
equally effective behavioural remedy is more burdensome (in monetary terms but not only) for the CA to implement. 
Recourse to structural remedies is only justified if an equally effective behavioural remedy is more burdensome for the 
undertaking at issue. In the same line A. Tajana, ‘Structural Remedies and Abuse of Dominant Position’, Tilburg 
University, TILEC Discussion Paper, DP 2005-033 (2005): 12.  
47  See note 38 above and accompanying text.  Energy Liberalization in Antitrust Straitjacket: A Plant Too Far? 
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power plants (VPPs), could not be considered an effective remedy in the E.ON’s case where one of the 
alleged abuses lies in strategic deterrence of investment in generation, in particular by offering new 
entrants to participate in E.ON’s power plants. Leaving aside the question, whether a ‘virtual’ 
divestment is equally effective in terms of mitigating market power in the pool to a “physical” one, it 
will deter rather than foster investments in generation (at least in the short run)
  48 and therefore, it 
might not address the alleged exclusionary abuse. For this reason only it would not constitute an 
equally effective behavioural remedy to the divestiture of assets.
49 It appears that by extending the 
scope of its concerns to exclusionary abuses, the Commission precludes any potentially equally 
effective behavioural remedies and justifies recourse to a structural solution. Accordingly, it states in 
its decision that there exists no equally effective behavioural remedy to the asset divestment to address 
its concerns for the German electricity wholesale market. Further, it argues that ‘a substantial risk of a 
lasting or repeated infringement by the alleged withholding of capacity […] derives from the very 
structure of the undertaking’ and that ‘withholding was possible due to the nature of E.ON’s electricity 
generation portfolio’.
50 Clearly, these lines reflect the Commission’s plans to restructure the energy 
industry according to its liberalization agenda. 
Assuming that a structural solution is justified in the light of the Commission’s preliminary 
assessment, that is, no equally effective behavioural remedy is available in the present case, it is still to 
be asked whether there is a less onerous but equally effective structural measure that would address 
the Commission’s anticompetitive concerns. 
•  Step 2: appropriate and necessary structural commitments? 
The following paragraphs take a closer look at E.ON’s generation portfolio and the selection of 
divested power plants in terms of fuel and technology. 
Table 1 below presents E.ON’s total generation capacity in the German wholesale electricity 
market short before the divestiture. The calculated percentage shows which technologies play a major 
part in the E.ON’s generation portfolio. 
                                                      
48  They may, however, stimulate investments in generation indirectly (in the long term, as a part of the Commission’s two-
stage strategy). See L. Hancher and A. de Hauteclocque, ‘Manufacturing the EU Energy Markets: The Current Dynamics 
of Regulatory Practice’, Competition and Regulation in Network Industries 11, 3 (2010): 327. 
49  There are few economic studies attempting to measure the effectiveness of VPPs. Boisseleau and Giesbertz study the 
impact of VPPs on competition and liquidity in the Dutch electricity market: F. Boisseleau and P. Giesbertz, ‘Assessing 
Regulatory Measures in Electricity Markets: The Case of VPP in the Netherlands’, 29th IAEE International Conference, 
7-10 June (2006), Potsdam; Federico and López study alternative market power mitigating measures and argue that an 
optimal divestiture of assets can be significantly more pro-competitive than the sale of capacities. According to their 
results, Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) can be at best as effective in bringing the prices down as divestiture of baseload 
generation of the same size, whereas divesting high-cost generation would mitigate market power more effectively. See 
G. Federico and A. L. López, ‘Divesting Power’, Public-Private Sector Research Centre, IESE Business School – 
University of Navarra, Working Paper 812 (2009). 
50  Commission Decision, note 20 above, paras. 81-82. Małgorzata Sadowska 
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Table 1  
E.ON’s generation capacity by sources – Germany, 2007. 
ENERGY SOURCE   C
S (MW)  C
S/TC (%) 
hydro (incl. pump storage)*  3153 12% 
nuclear  8548 33% 
lignite coal  1314 5% 
hard coal  7466 28% 
gas  4219 16% 
oil  1145 4% 
others (wind, biomass et al.)  406 2% 
TOTAL CAPACITY  26251 100% 
C
S – capacity by source 
TC – total capacity 
* Pumped storage hydroelectric power plants provide peak load power.  
Source: Own calculation on the basis of data from E.ON, ‘Strategy and Key Figures’, 2008: 39-42. 
The first three technologies (hydro
51, nuclear, lignite) represent E.ON’s base-load generation. Together 
they account for half of E.ON’s total capacity. Hard coal, the next cheapest fuel source along E.ON’s 
merit-order curve, amounts to 28% of its generation. The smallest, but still not negligible share of 
E.ON’s production covers peak demand (especially gas and oil – 20%). Thus, E.ON generation 
portfolio reflects a cross-section of technologies covering all demand levels with a substantial share of 
low-cost generation, nuclear in particular. According to the Commission’s preliminary assessment, 
E.ON had both the ‘incentive’ to withdraw capacity (substantial number of low-cost power plants) and 
the ‘availability’ to implement this strategy (a number of higher-cost plants in the middle of the merit-
order curve).
52 Due to the lack of information on E.ON’s contract coverage, this analysis assumes that 
E.ON’s total capacity is traded in the pool in which case its incentive (and ability) for unilateral 
capacity withdrawal is the biggest. 
To examine whether the structural remedy imposed in the E.ON’s case was designed to address the 
alleged abuses, Table 2 lists the divested assets by fuel sources. The calculated percentage 
demonstrates what share of each technology has been divested.  
                                                      
51  E.ON’s hydroelectric business consists of conventional power plants (mostly run-of-river) providing constant supply of 
electricity and pumped-storage peak-load power plants. Due to the lack of data, this calculation does not differentiate 
between hydro base-load and hydro peak-load generation.  
52  Commission Decision, note 20 above, paras. 40 and 82. Energy Liberalization in Antitrust Straitjacket: A Plant Too Far? 
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Table 2 
E.ON’s divested capacity by sources – November 2008. 
DIVESTED ENERGY SOURCE  CD
S (MW)  CD
S/C
S (%) 
hydro (run-of-river)   359,3 11% 
nuclear  1500 17% 
lignite coal  604,5 46% 
hard coal  1744,6 23% 
gas  491 11% 
oil  0   
hydro (pump-storage)  347 11% 
others (wind, biomass et al.)  0   
TOTAL CAPACITY DIVESTED  5046 19% 
CD
S - capacity divested by source 
C
S - capacity by source (see Table 1) 
Source: Own calculation on the basis of Commission Decision (Fn .20), Annex ‘Commitments to the European 
Commission’ (Schedule 1 and 3) and E.ON, ‘Strategy and Key Figures’, 2008: 39-42. 
E.ON offered to divest a big share of its base-load generation. These divestitures include hydroelectric 
run-of-river power plants (approx. one-tenth of its total hydro generation
53), nuclear (also nearly one-
fifth) and lignite (almost half of its brown coal generation).
54 Moreover, E.ON offered additional 
divestitures further up the merit order: disposal of 20% of its coal-based generation, one gas-fired 
power plant (approx. one-tenth of E.ON’s gas-fuelled business) and two pump-storage hydro power 
plants. The offered commitments prompt two general observations. First, the divestiture reduced 
E.ON’s capacity in absolute terms (by 20%). Second, it did not change its portfolio structure. 
Following the divestiture, the shares of the technology sources in the E.ON’s total generation 
remained virtually unchanged. To demonstrate this, Table 3 reflects E.ON’s generation structure post-
divestiture and juxtaposes it with its pre-divestiture production. 
                                                      
53  Incl. pump-storage, see note 51 above. In reality, divestiture of run-of-river plants accounted for a higher share of E.ON’s 
hydro base-load generation. 
54  However it must be borne in mind that the biggest share in E.ON’s base-load generation goes to nuclear technology, 
whereas lignite-fired power plants account only for 5% of E.ON’s total generation capacity.  
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Table 3 
E.ON’s generation portfolio post- vs. pre-divestiture. 
POST-DIVESTITURE  PRE-DIVESTITURE  ENERGY SOURCE  
C
S (MW)  C
S/TC (%)  C
S/TC (%) 
hydro (incl. pump storage)*  2446,7 12% 12%
nuclear  7048 33% 33%
lignite coal  709,5 3% 5%
hard coal  5721,4 27% 28%
gas  3728 18% 16%
oil  1145 5% 4%
others (wind, biomass et al.)  406 2% 2%
TOTAL CAPACITY  21204,6 100% 100%
C
S – capacity by source  
TC – total capacity 
* Pumped storage hydroelectric power plants provide peak load power.  
 
Source: Own calculation on the basis of Commission Decision (Fn.20), Annex ‘Commitments to the European 
Commission’ (Schedule 1 and 3) and E.ON, ‘Strategy and Key Figures’, 2008: 39-42. 
•  Commitments and exploitative concerns 
As mentioned in section II, the profitability of capacity withholding to drive up prices depends on 
many factors.
55 It appears from the reasoning in the E.ON decision that the Commission attached the 
greatest importance to the size and the structure of the generation portfolio, claiming that it created 
both the incentive and the possibility for E.ON to pursue the abusive strategy.
56 The accepted 
divestiture indeed scaled the generator’s production portfolio down in terms of figures but did not 
change its structure. In fact, each technology owned by E.ON accounts for the same proportion of its 
total production as it did pre-divestiture. 
Economic literature provides some guidelines as to the remedy design addressing the exercise of 
market power in the electricity wholesale markets. To start with, it is widely accepted in the literature 
that the ownership of marginal generation confers greater market power than the ownership of base-
load plants, even though both types of assets contribute to the presence of market power.
57 In line with 
this argument, some recent economic studies suggest that divestiture of high-cost (marginal) assets is 
more effective in mitigating market power than the divestment of base-load generation. Crawford, 
Crespo and Tauchen (2007) used the BFE approach
 to model the British electricity wholesale market. 
According to their results, divestiture of higher-cost generation was more effective in bringing the 
                                                      
55  Based on the unilateral profit maximization logic of a withholding generator by Joskow and Kahn (note 28 above). See 
Annex, Figure 2 and accompanying text. 
56  Commission Decision, note 20 above, paras. 82 and 84. 
57  Newbery, note 25 above: 68; OECD, note 19 above: 116-117; M. Arellano and P. Serra, ‘A model of market power in 
electricity industries subject to peak load pricing’, Energy Policy 35, 10 (2007): 5130-5135; Federico and others, note 19 
above: 13; Federico and López, note 49: 4; A. Banal Estañol and A. Rupérez Micola, ‘Composition of Electricity 
Generation Portfolios, Pivotal Dynamics, and Market Prices’, Management Science, 55, 11 (2009): 1813-1831. Energy Liberalization in Antitrust Straitjacket: A Plant Too Far? 
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prices down than divestiture of base-load generation.
58 Wolak and McRae (2008) came to the same 
conclusion when discussing the remedies imposed in a U.S. merger case between Exelon and PSEG 
(2005/06).
59 The U.S. DoJ ordered divestiture of assets with the lowest opportunity cost of 
withholding them from the market, that is, with marginal costs close to the market-clearing price. The 
U.S. DoJ argued in this case that the remedy would effectively reduce the incentives of the merging 
firms to manipulate electricity wholesale prices. No divestiture of the parties’ numerous nuclear assets 
was required, since withholding them would be too costly. Wolak and McRae welcomed the remedy 
package in the Exelon/PSEG case and reasoned that the divestiture of high-cost generation, affecting 
the shape of the marginal cost function (rendering it flatter), diminished the incentives to exercise 
market power more effectively than selling off base-load plants.
60 More recently, the paper by 
Federico and López (2009) produced similar results. The authors found that for sufficiently large 
divestments, a divestment of higher-cost capacity
61 can be several times more effective in bringing the 
prices down than a divestment of base-load generation of the same size. More specific with regard to 
the E.ON case is a model of capacity withholding equilibrium designed by Lave and Perekhodtsev 
(2001) and applied to the California electricity market. In their setting an eventual divestiture reducing 
withholding incentives would involve gas-fired price-setting generation.
62 
The insights from the economic literature on the electricity markets suggest that a targeted 
divestiture reduces prices more effectively than an across-the-board divestiture. Disposal of high-cost 
generation flattens the individual merit order curve of a portfolio generator and thus reduces its 
incentive to use its assets strategically. It does not mean, however, that the remedy imposed on E.ON 
was not pro-competitive. In the electricity wholesale market, these are the assets with similar marginal 
costs that exercise competitive constraint at a given demand level. This competitive pressure is gone, 
once the assets belong to one and the same generator. Thus, it can raise the price with no risk of being 
undercut by competitors’ generation. A pivotal generator does not even have to strategically reduce its 
output to be able to raise the price. If, however, the assets with similar marginal costs belong to 
competing generators, the submitted bids are lower reflecting the attempts of the generators to 
undercut each other. In other words, the E.ON’s across-the-board divestiture does mitigate market 
power in the German wholesale electricity market, as it assures that E.ON faces competition at each 
demand level, reducing its pivotalness.
63 It does not, however, address the alleged strategy of 
                                                      
58  Crawford, Crespo and Tauchen, note 29 above: 1257-1258: ‘This difference in results highlights the importance of the 
location of divested capacity in marginal cost order for the consequences of divestiture: when intermediate load 
generation is divested there is less inframarginal capacity and the foregone markup from pricing out units is higher. 
When base load is divested, there is less inframarginal capacity over which markups can accrue, but the forgone 
revenues from pricing out intermediate units remains little changed.’ 
59  United States v. Exelon Corporation and Public Services Enterprise Group, Inc. Wolak assisted the U.S. DoJ in the 
competitive assessment of this merger. See also Armington and others, note 38 above: 320-322, for the description of 
remedies. 
60  Wolak and McRae, note 38 above: 28-30. The authors use the residual demand analysis framework to study the impact of 
different technologies on wholesale prices. They demonstrate that the shape of the marginal cost curve of a generator 
affects its incentives to exercise unilateral market power.  
61  Federico and López, note 49 above, argue that an optimal divestment (resulting in the greatest price reduction) includes 
plants that become marginal post-divestment, that is, whose range of costs encompasses the post-divestment competitive 
price (implying that some but not all of the divested capacity produces in post-divestment equilibrium). Extending their 
model, in 2010 the authors used the data from the Italian electricity wholesale market to design a single divestment 
package capable of reducing market power across multiply demand levels; see G. Federico and A. L. López, ‘Selecting 
Effective Divestments in Electricity Generation Markets’, Public-Private Sector Research Centre, IESE Business School 
– University of Navarra, Working Paper 845 (2010), forthcoming in European Transactions on Electrical Power. 
62  L. B. Lave and D. Perekhodstev, ‘Capacity Witholding Equilibrium in Wholesale Electricity Markets’, Carnegie-Mellon 
Electricity Industry Center Working Paper, CEIC 01-01 (2001): 19. 
63  Armington and others, note 38 above: 317; Wolak and McRae, note 38 above: 28-30. Małgorzata Sadowska 
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unilateral capacity withdrawal directly, the risk of which the Commission wanted to eliminate in the 
first place.  
The Commission reaffirmed in its decision that ‘the commitments shall address specific concerns 
of an abuse expressed in the preliminary assessment and not the dominant position of the undertaking 
concerned’.
64 Accordingly, with respect to the proportionality of remedy in the E.ON case, the 
Commission stated that the divestiture proposed by E.ON ‘removes the incentive to withdraw 
generation capacity profitably’ and that ‘the selection of power plants in terms of fuel and technology 
[...] was necessary and proportionate to meet the concerns on the wholesale market for electricity’.
65 
This would suggest that the amount of divested generation was sufficient to prevent further 
withdrawals of capacity. The Commission seems to have taken it for granted, since no calculation has 
been done to assess whether the capacity withdrawal was profitable for E.ON in the first place, nor 
whether it ceased to be profitable post-divestiture. Such exercise was not required in a preliminary 
assessment under Article 9. Assuming that it was profitable enough for E.ON to pursue the alleged 
strategy, it remains doubtful whether the divestiture of higher-cost generation effectively eliminated 
the risk of further withdrawal. The divested generation, aside of low-cost plants, included one-fifth of 
E.ON’s hard coal generation, one peak-load gas power station (one-tenth of E.ON’s gas generation) 
and two pump-storage hydro power plants. The disposal of hard coal- and gas-fired power plants 
lessens the volume of ‘generation to withdraw’ but does not remove it, since post-divestiture E.ON is 
left with the remaining 83% of its high-cost generation (hard coal, gas- and oil-fired generation 
together). Moreover, E.ON could have some interest in divesting certain uncompetitive or older assets. 
For example, the nowadays heavily subsidized hard coal power plants are supposed to be closed by the 
end of 2018.
66 In these circumstances it might have been convenient for E.ON to divest one-fifth of its 
loss-making business in an antitrust deal. With regard to the pump-storage hydro assets, their 
divestment is clearly pro-competitive. A competitor owning such assets would be able to ‘store’ 
electricity and sell it on the market during peak demand periods mitigating E.ON’s market power. 
However, it is questionable whether these plants could play part of a profitable withdrawal strategy, 
since their production depends highly on the changeable weather conditions. Taking into consideration 
their specific function (balancing market, energy reserves), they do not provide capacities that could 
be withdrawn from the market. 
•  Commitments and exclusionary concerns 
The concerns of the Commission related also to E.ON’s deterrence of investment in the power 
generation business. In that respect the Commission argued that ‘the divestiture commitment is 
necessary and proportionate as it also addresses the concerns with regard to deterrence of 
investment’. Again, the literature on electricity markets would rather suggest a disposal of high-cost 
generation, since price-setting capacity exercises a greater competitive constraint than the one imposed 
by base-load generation. The entry of independent marginal generation can be much more pro-
competitive than the entry of low-cost plants.
67 However, as observed in the sector inquiry, the 
                                                      
64  Commission Decision, note 20 above, para. 60. 
65  Ibid., paras. 80 and 84. 
66  Council Decision of 10 December 2010 on State aid to facilitate the closure of uncompetitive coal mines, OJ L 336, 21 
December 2010, pp. 24–29. 
67  According to Federico and López, note 49 above, entry of price-setting plants can be significantly more effective in 
reducing prices than the entry of base-load plants, pp. 10-11: ‘Entry of this type [high cost capacity] shifts the residual 
demand function of the dominant firm in the same way as a divestment but does not affect its cost curve. Its impact on 
prices is therefore the same as obtained with a divestiture, as long as the dominant firm prices on its pre-divestment cost 
function (i.e. its costs do not increase relative to the pre-divestment equilibrium). […]Preposition 1 therefore indicates 
that marginal (or price-setting) entry is more effective than baseload entry in constraining market prices, assuming the 
cost of the new capacity is determined by the same cost function as the dominant firm.’ Energy Liberalization in Antitrust Straitjacket: A Plant Too Far? 
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competitors actually do have access to peak-load generation. According to the findings, the 
investments in generation of the past few years focused on high-cost gas and wind technologies.
68 
Similarly, the Commission mentions in the decision that ‘in practice only more expensive gas-fired 
capacity was added to the market by the new entrants after 2001’.
69 Base-load generation usually 
comes along with higher fixed costs and the new entrants find it more attractive to invest in peak 
generation. The Commission thus reasoned that ‘the divested plants will help actual and potential 
competitors to get access to new plants and plants with technologies that they do not possess. The 
acquisition of such generation capacity will allow the competitors to have a more balanced portfolio 
and more capacity to exert competitive pressure on the incumbents in the wholesale electricity 
market’.
70 Assuring the competitors’ balanced portfolios justifies the divestiture of base-load 
generation characterised by higher economic barriers of entry and investment. Hence, the concerns of 
exclusionary nature appear to be an excuse for the across-the-board divestiture, as only in that way the 
Commission is able to explain the disposal of E.ON’s base-load generation.  
To sum up, it is highly questionable whether a divestment of power plants representing a cross-
section of E.ON’s generation portfolio is the best-suited remedy for a strategic capacity withdrawal. 
Nonetheless, the accumulation of anticompetitive concerns in the preliminary assessment, which went 
beyond the alleged capacity withdrawal abuse, allowed the Commission first to recourse to a structural 
solution disregarding alternative behavioural remedies and then to justify an across-the-board 
divestiture, reducing E.ON’s market share in absolute terms. The ultimate shape of the commitment 
package was thus a result of negotiations between the Commission, pursuing a goal of energy market 
liberalization, and E.ON, acting in its own strategic interest.  
IV. Conclusions 
The attempt of this paper is to signal a risky development in the EU antitrust enforcement in the 
context of energy markets. Coming out with the sector inquiry report the Commission was plain-
spoken about its plans to deploy competition rules as a vehicle for liberalizing the energy sector.
71 The 
follow-up antitrust actions have been tailored to meet these plans. The new antitrust enforcement 
framework with commitment procedure and structural remedies enabled the Commission a quick 
intervention, flexible problem-solving and allowed for decisive changes in the energy market setting.  
However these cases are not antitrust anymore. They constitute a new phenomenon, a peculiar 
‘negotiatory’ antitrust, characterized by weak cases with extensive remedies. The Commission’s 
reasoning in the E.ON decision is far-fetched and lacks consistency. These flaws in argumentation 
result from the fact that the outcome of negotiations between the Commission and E.ON has to 
comply with the standard Article 102 framework, according to which the Commission needs to 
express its concerns as to the alleged dominant position and its abuse and the commitments it accepts 
must address these concerns. One should bear in mind that the E.ON decision was issued in the end of 
2008, which is a year after the General Court quashed the Commission’s decision in the Alrosa case. 
At the time of the E.ON investigation, the Alrosa case was pending before the ECJ and the outcome 
was still far from clear.
72 Accordingly, the Commission formulated the E.ON decision with a great 
caution trying to comply with the principle of proportionality and to defend the accepted divestitures 
with additional exclusionary concerns, sometimes resorting to strained arguments.  
                                                      
68  Final Report, note.3 above, para. 407.  
69  Commission Decision, note 20 above, para. 39. 
70  Ibid., para. 85. 
71  See, for instance, Kroes, note 2 above. 
72  AG Kokott’s favourable opinion, being the first positive signal from the ECJ, which could increase the Commission’s 
self-confidence in Article 9 proceedings, has been issued much later, in November 2009. Małgorzata Sadowska 
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Harnessing antitrust enforcement to pursue liberalization policy objectives ultimately causes harm 
to competition policy itself. Once governed by political choices of energy market liberalization, 
antitrust rules, bent and stretched beyond their proper limits, slip out of their own systemic framework. 
Where does competition policy end and where does liberalization policy begin? With the Courts’ 
hands-off approach to commitment decisions as demonstrated in the Alrosa  case, drawing a line 


















Source: own illustration 
 
Figure 1 illustrates price formation on a competitive short term electricity market with no generation capacity 
constraints. It demonstrates the basic features of power markets. First of all, the elasticity of demand for 
electricity is very low. In fact, it comes close to zero in the short run. Hence, to keep things simple, it is depicted 
as a vertical line at the value of the load forecast for the given time period. Apart from that, demand is volatile 
over time, raising and falling in daily, weekly and seasonally patterns. Since electricity cannot be stored at a 
reasonable cost, its supply must be flexible enough to respond to the constant changes in demand. This means 
that some power plants operate on a constant basis, serving as baseload generation, whereas additional power 
plants will only go on stream in peak hours. Electricity can be generated using different production technology. 
The variety of power generation methods creates substantial discrepancies in production costs. For this reason it 
is efficient to use the low cost power plants (hydro, nuclear, renewable power) on a permanent basis, covering 
the base load demand as much as possible. By contrast, high cost plants are brought into production only during 
the peak hours and subsequently deactivated as soon as demand falls (so called ‘peak plants’). Following this 
logic, Figure 1 presents the aggregated supply curve in form of a ‘merit order’ curve which ranks plants with 
respect to their production costs (and the technology they use accordingly). The market price is determined by 
the crossing point of the supply and demand curves, which equals the level of short run marginal cost (SRMC) of 
the plant generating the last unit of electricity required to meet demand.
 In case there is an increase in demand 
(demand curve shifts to the right) the next most efficient power plant is called to generate and the price rises to 
the level of its SRMC. Consequently, the price decided by the SRMC of the last plant called to generate 
determines not only the revenues of the marginal generator but also the revenues of all the electricity producers 
owning plants on the left hand side of the merit order curve. As can be seen from the chart, the further away to 
the left the plant is ranked, that is, the lower variable costs it has, the higher is its mark up.  Małgorzata Sadowska 
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Figure 2 
The effect of capacity withdrawal on price formation in a competitive short-term electricity 

























Source: own illustration Energy Liberalization in Antitrust Straitjacket: A Plant Too Far? 
21 
An increase in demand raises the market price. Just as decrease in supply. An electricity generator, withdrawing 
its plant from the market or running it below its full nameplate capacity, creates a shortage in supply which 
must be filled up with additional units of power provided by the plant standing just behind the marginal plant in 
the merit order, called to generate as a second-best. In this way the new plant becomes the marginal one and its 
marginal costs from now on determine the market price. It goes without saying that the new plant coming on 
stream does not have to belong to the withdrawing generator. All generators get the higher market price for the 
volume of electricity they supply, irrespective of who owns the price-setting capacity. Although the new market 
equilibrium increases the revenues of all producing generators, not all of them would actually opt for output 
limitation in order to enjoy a higher price. The strategy of capacity withdrawal implies a trade off between the 
planned, therefore certain, output reduction and the expected, therefore uncertain, increase in price. A generator 
finds it profitable to withdraw capacity only if the expected mark-up earned from the price increase exceeds the 
loss linked to the fall in output. Joskow and Kahn (2002), note 18 above, formulate the unilateral profit 
maximization logic of a withholding generator as follows:  
Δ Profit    =    [ (Q  – Δ Q) * Δ P]     –     (Δ Q  * P)    +    Δ c, where 
Q  -  generator’s capacity sold through the pool 
Δ Q  -  capacity withdrawn 
P  -  price level without withdrawal 
Δ P  -  price increase due to withdrawal 
Δ c  -  (avoided) operating cost of producing Δ Q 
From the equation it appears that the profitability of capacity withdrawal for a generator depends on several key 
factors.  
(i) First of all, one must consider the generator’s market share in the market [Q]. Generators controlling 
capacity that is small relative to the size of the market have no incentive to limit their output as such withdrawal 
would be unlikely to materially affect the market price. A generator must account for a significant proportion of 
total industry generation to allow for a withdrawal that brings about a price increase [Q with respect to Δ Q]. 
Further, the bigger the generator is, the greater is its incentive to withhold, as the mark-up over its remaining 
production will more than offset the loss in output. Relating to this, one must remember that Q stands not for 
the generator’s total capacity, but the one sold on the power exchange. If a big share of the generator’s total 
capacity is sold under contracts (therefore already excluded from the pool), the remaining output that can be 
strategically used by the generator is already limited. In such a case the incentive and the ability to make further 
withdrawals decreases accordingly. 
(ii) Secondly, the incentive to withdraw increases with the price rise [Δ P]. A generator would not withhold 
capacity at any time (at any demand level), but rather in the periods of high demand, when even a small 
withdrawal results in a substantial price increase. In the periods of low demand, a withdrawal of the same size 
would result in a modest price increase, due to the flatter slope of the industry’s merit order curve. Just for the 
record, the new market-clearing price is determined by the marginal costs of the next generating unit called on 
stream. It does not matter whether this unit belongs to the withholding generator or to one of its competitors as 
even in the latter case the generator is able to forecast the price increase with high accuracy. In peak hours due 
to capacity or transmission constraints the new marginal generator might be pivotal and set a market-clearing 
price above its marginal costs, as there will be no other capacities available on the market. Although capacity 
withdrawal is a unilateral exercise of market power, generators may well collude and reduce their capacities in 
concert in order to make one of them pivotal, able to explore the capacity constraints.  
(iii) Third, since low-cost generation enjoys the highest price mark-up [(Q  – Δ Q) * Δ P], the profitability of 
capacity withdrawal hinges on the generator’s asset portfolio, which must include a sufficient number of low-
cost plants. At the same time, having only base-load-oriented portfolio is not enough, since withdrawing low-
cost generation would appear too costly. The optimal candidate portfolio for a profitable withdrawal should also 
include ‘plants to withdraw’, which are more expensive in operation [higher Δ c] and have lower shutdown 
opportunity costs [Δ Q * P] than the base-load units. These higher-cost plants are not necessary peak plants, 
since these already operate in a limited period of time. Rather they can be characterized as high-cost 
inframarginal generation, to limit the cost of withdrawal but at the same time to be sure the strategy actually 
affects the market price. According to the Commission officials writing in a personal capacity, the optimal asset 
portfolio for limiting output strategy should, on the one hand, provide incentive to withdraw (a sufficient 
number of base-load generation units), on the other hand, guarantee the availability to withdraw (higher-cost 
plants in the middle of the merit-order curve) [P. Chauve and others, ‘The E.ON electricity cases: an antitrust 
decision with structural remedies’, Competition Policy Newsletter 1 (2009): 51-54]. This grouping of 
generation assets into “incentive assets” and “ability assets” helps to understand the logic behind the capacity 
withdrawal but it should not be used in the individual cases, as it oversimplifies the picture and might lead to 
errors in the assessment. Some plants, especially those in the middle of the merit order curve, might be 
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